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Miscalibration is a form of overconfidence examined in both psychology and economics. Although
it is often analyzed in lab experiments, there is scant evidence about the effects of miscalibration in
practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and study the determinants of
their miscalibration. We study a unique panel of over 11,600 probability distributions provided by
top financial executives and spanning nearly a decade of stock market expectations. Our results show
that financial executives are severely miscalibrated: realized market returns are within the executives’
80% confidence intervals only 33% of the time. We show that miscalibration improves following poor
market performance periods because forecasters extrapolate past returns when forming their lower
forecast bound (“worst case scenario”), while they do not update the upper bound (“best case scenario”)
as much. Finally, we link stock market miscalibration to miscalibration about own-firm project forecasts
and increased corporate investment.
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In designing corporate policies, managers must estimate future unknowns (e.g., demand, 
cash flows, competition), a task that is complicated by miscalibration.
1 Evidence from 
psychological lab experiments indicates that people are generally miscalibrated, in that their 
forecast probability distributions are too narrow. This happens either because people 
overestimate their ability to predict the future
2 or because they underestimate the volatility of 
random events.
3 But while miscalibration is a well-documented effect in the lab, to the best of 
our knowledge, there is no systematic evidence of miscalibration among business executives.  
Our paper is the first to apply a laboratory approach to measure miscalibration in a 
population of thousands of real world financial managers. We measure the miscalibration of 
managers in a unique sample of over 11,600 S&P 500 forecasts made by top U.S. financial 
executives. Our measure is based on beliefs (with respect to the true distribution of outcomes) 
and is operationalized using a method drawn from laboratory experiments. We measure the 
extent to which financial executives are well-calibrated and we study the channels through which 
miscalibration occurs. Finally, we test whether stock market miscalibration is related to 
miscalibration of own-firm internal rate of return (IRR) and to the intensity of corporate 
investment. 
Each quarter from March 2001 to February 2010, we surveyed U.S. Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs) and asked them to predict one- and ten-year stock market returns, as well as the 
10
th and 90
th percentiles of the distribution of market returns (“worst case” and “best case” 
outcomes). We follow Odean (1998), Kyle and Wang (1997), and Hackbarth (2008) in using 
                                                           
1 In the psychology literature, researchers usually refer to “miscalibration” as overconfidence. Conversely, in the 
finance literature, researchers often use the term overconfidence to express “above average” feeling (e.g., 
Malmendier and Tate 2005 and 2008, and Malmendier, Tate and Yan 2006). In this study we use “miscalibration” 
and “overconfidence” interchangeably. When overconfidence is in the sense “above average,” we state it explicitly. 
2 Surveyed subjects typically provide confidence bounds for their predictions that are too narrow (Alpert and Raiffa 
1982). Researchers also document that experts in a variety of professional fields overestimate the precision of their 
information, e.g., clinical psychologists (Oskamp 1965), and physicians and nurses (Christensen-Szalanski and 
Bushyhead 1981, Baumann, Deber, and Thompson 1991). 
3 Studies have shown that professionals are miscalibrated with regard to estimating the probabilities of random 
outcomes, for example, engineers (Kidd 1970) and entrepreneurs (Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg 1988). Related to 
our study, Von Holstein (1972) documents that investment bankers provide miscalibrated forecasts of stock market 
returns; Deaves, Luders, and Schröder (2005) find that stock market forecasters are miscalibrated on average and 
become more overconfident with previous successful forecasts; and Bar-Yosef and Venezia (2006) report that 
subjects (students and security analysts) in the laboratory exhibit miscalibration in their predictions of future 
accounting numbers. Deaves, Luders, and Lou (2003) find that laboratory subjects who are miscalibrated also tend 
to trade excessively. None of these studies link miscalibration to real actions in the corporate world. 2 
 
second moment information to define the narrowness of individual probability distributions for 
stock market returns, which provides us with a measure of each respondent’s miscalibration (i.e., 
the standardized narrowness of the confidence interval).
4 
Miscalibration is a behavioral bias that is an aspect of overconfidence. Previous research 
in finance treats overconfidence as feeling “above average”.
5 In contrast, our design focuses on 
miscalibration of beliefs.
6 As a result, we use a different lens than that previously employed in 
the field (e.g., the approach of Malmendier and Tate (2005)). According to our definition, 
miscalibrated people overestimate the precision of their own forecasts, or underestimate the 
variance of risky processes; in other words, their subjective probability distributions are too 
narrow. 
Our interpretation of miscalibration is important when testing theoretical predictions 
concerning the effects of biases on corporate policies. Theoretical models distinguish between 
optimistic managers who overestimate the mean of their firms’ cash flows (Shefrin 2001, Heaton 
2002, Hackbarth 2008), which we refer to as optimism, and miscalibrated managers who either 
underestimate the volatility of their firms’ future cash flows (Shefrin 2001, Hackbarth 2008) or 
overweight their private signals relative to public information (Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 
2007, Gervais and Goldstein 2007).
7 Our data allow us to disentangle respondents’ biases in the 
first and second moments. In other words, we can separate miscalibration from optimism. To our 
knowledge, our paper is the only one with direct and distinct measures of miscalibration and 
optimism and the only one to link both of these constructs to firms and their actions. 
                                                           
4 Although we measure relative calibration, we use the term miscalibration because the majority of CFOs provide 
responses that would be considered miscalibrated by any reasonable metric, as discussed in Section 3. 
5 In several papers Malmendier and Tate measure CEOs’ overconfidence in the sense of feeling “above average” 
(Malmendier and Tate 2005 and 2008, and Malmendier, Tate and Yan 2006). Their measure is based on the degree 
of under-diversification of the executives’ personal portfolios, and also according to the CEOs’ representation in the 
popular press (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). They show that biased executives exhibit high investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, engage intensively in unsuccessful mergers and acquisitions, and avoid tapping the capital markets. 
Using their news-based proxy, Hribar and Yang (2006) show that firms with CEOs who feel “above average” are 
more likely to issue point estimates in their earnings forecasts (rather than estimate ranges), to issue narrow range 
estimates, and to manage earnings to meet these forecasts. 
6 See Lichtenstein and Fischoff (1977), Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischoff (1980), Lichtenstein, Fischoff, and 
Phillips (1982), Kruger and Dunning (1999), Alba and Hutchison (2000), Shefrin (2001), Soll and Klayman (2004), 
and Hackbarth (2008). 
7 Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Odean (1999), and Gervais and Odean (2001) use similar 
overconfidence definitions for stock market investors. 3 
 
Our survey respondents are finance officers, mostly CFOs.
8 Previous research motivates 
studying the behavior of financial executives. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show that there is a 
pronounced “CFO fixed effect” in corporate decisions but they do not study managerial 
characteristics of individual CFOs. Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2010) present evidence that CFOs 
play a relatively important role in decisions such as capital allocation. Kaplan, Klebanov and 
Sorensen (2010) link the performance of chief executives to 30 individual characteristics. 
Our main contribution is in testing managerial miscalibration and understanding the 
drivers of this bias. In the quarterly survey, CFOs provide expected stock market returns and an 
80% confidence interval for their prediction. According to the confidence bounds that CFOs 
provide, they are severely miscalibrated: only 33% of the time do realized S&P 500 returns fall 
within the 80% confidence interval that respondents offer. Even during the least volatile quarters 
in our sample, only 59% of realized returns fall within the 80% confidence intervals provided.  
Importantly, we document that miscalibration is time varying and explore its underlying 
economic mechanism. We show that CFOs have wider confidence intervals following negative 
return periods. We explore the mechanism that drives this result and find that it relates to 
asymmetric extrapolations on the part of executives. Specifically, when forming the lower bound 
(“worst case”), CFOs extrapolate past returns, especially when they are negative. The upper 
bound (“best case”) is far less sensitive to past returns. Therefore, following bad periods in the 
stock market, the lower bound decreases, while the upper bound remains almost static—and the 
confidence interval that executives provide widens.  
This behavior is consistent with Soll and Klayman’s (2004) argument that people make 
inferences about the distribution of random or unknown variables from a few known cases (such 
as past returns), and with the work of Arnold (1986), March and Shapira (1987) and Kahneman 
and Lovallo (1993), who argue that managers focus on downside risk. In addition, we document 
that miscalibration and optimism are time-persistent personal characteristics; executives with 
these characteristics adapt very little in response to new data realizations. 
We also study whether miscalibration is correlated with the corporate internal rate of 
return (IRR) and investment. We find that the degree of miscalibration on S&P 500 returns is 
                                                           
8 Our population of executives is different from groups previously studied in the behavioral finance field. For 
example, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2006) study overconfidence (in the 
sense of “above average”) in the population of CEOs. 4 
 
correlated with the narrowness of own-firm IRR forecasts. Furthermore, firms with miscalibrated 
executives invest more on average; the effect is magnified when miscalibrated executives are 
optimistic as well.  
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the method that we use to collect the 
miscalibration data and the construction of variables; it also presents some summary statistics. In 
Section 3, we provide evidence on the miscalibration in CFO expectations. Section 4 explores 
the determinants of miscalibration. Section 5 tests the relation between CFO miscalibration and 
optimism to corporate forecasts and corporate investment policy. Some concluding remarks are 
offered in Section 6. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Executive  Survey 
Our study is based on a unique data set of stock market predictions made by senior 
finance executives, the majority of whom are CFOs and financial vice presidents. The data were 
collected in 37 quarterly surveys conducted by Duke University between March 2001 and 
February 2010. Each quarter, we poll between 2,000 and 3,000 financial officers with a short 
survey on important topical issues (Graham and Harvey 2006). The usual response rate for the 
quarterly survey is 5% to 8% and most of the responses arrive within the first two days of the 
survey invitation date.
9 The survey usually contains eight questions about the U.S. economy, 
firm policies, and short-term corporate expectations. Some of the questions are identical for each 
survey and some change over time depending on economic conditions. The historical surveys as 
well as aggregated responses can be accessed at www.cfosurvey.org. 
We base our miscalibration proxies on two survey questions. The first question is: 
Over the next year, I expect the annual S&P 500 return will be: 
- There is a 1-in-10 chance the actual return will be less than ___% 
- I expect the return to be: ___% 
- There is a 1-in-10 chance the actual return will be greater than ___% 
                                                           
9 The bulk of our tests exploit variation within the respondent group, yet the overall response rate of 5% to 8% could 
potentially lead to non-response bias in the inference of some tests (e.g., in Section 3). We explore this issue further 
in Section 2.5. 5 
 
The second question is similar but relates to annualized stock market return forecasts over the 
next 10 years. The initial words change from “Over the next year, I expect the S&P 500 return 
will be” to “Over the next 10 years, I expect the average annual S&P 500 return will be”.
10 
In contrast to most studies that use survey data, we are able to examine the characteristics 
of a sizable fraction of the respondents. Although the survey does not require CFOs to provide 
identifying information, about half of the firms voluntarily provide such information, and about a 
quarter of the firms are confirmed to be U.S. public companies.  
Overall our sample includes 11,681 one-year expected returns and 11,353 ten-year 
expected returns with valid 10
th and 90
th percentile information. Of this sample, 4,028 
observations are from public companies (self-reported), and of them, we are able to match 3,201 
observations (1,030 unique firms) to CRSP and Compustat. For 2,044 observations (672 unique 
firms) there is a full set of survey responses, accounting and market data. 
2.2.   Measuring Miscalibration 
Our miscalibration measure maps each CFO’s 10
th and 90
th percentile predictions into an 
individual probability distribution. Wide distributions reflect high subjective uncertainty about 
the estimated variable, while narrow distributions reflect subjective confidence. By employing 
executives’ estimates for the same common macroeconomic variable, we avoid using private 
information in the forecasting process. 
Starting with the confidence bound information, we use the Davidson and Cooper (1976) 
method to recover respondent i’s individual probability distribution, based on the normal 
distribution. The imputed individual volatility is calculated as:  
        
   .       .   
          ( 1 )  
where x(0.90) and x(0.10) represent the 90
th and 10
th percentile of the respondent’s distribution, 
and  Z is the number of standard deviations within the confidence interval. For confidence 
intervals of 80% in a normal distribution, Z equals 2.65. Keefer and Bodily (1983) show that, 
given information about the 10
th and 90
th percentiles, this simple approximation is the preferred 
method for estimating the standard deviation of a probability distribution of a random variable.  
                                                           
10 The first question has appeared in its current form since 2001Q2. The current form of the second question dates 
from 2002Q1. 6 
 
We note however that the distribution of the imputed individual volatility is skewed to 
the right; therefore, we use a logged version of the imputed individual volatility, which assumes 
that the logged distribution of returns is normally distributed: 
                 
                                     
 .     1    (2) 
Then, we winsorize the variable by 1% within survey date, to temper the effect of 
outliers. Also, we multiply the variable by minus one, so that low imputed individual volatility 
will correspond to higher miscalibration. Finally, as miscalibration should be determined within 
the survey date (as market conditions change over time), we standardize the variables to have a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one within each survey date. As CFOs provide 
estimates for short-term (one year) and long-term (10 year) S&P 500 average returns, we create 
short- and long-term miscalibration variables: Miscalibration ST and Miscalibration LT. 
2.3. Measuring  Optimism 
Our survey data have the advantage of allowing us to measure miscalibration while 
simultaneously controlling for potential optimism in expected returns. We create two optimism 
variables, Optimism ST and Optimism LT, based on expected one- and ten-year return forecasts, 
respectively. The optimism variables are formed using a procedure that parallels the construction 
of the miscalibration variables. First, we add one and log the expected return estimate of the S&P 
500. Second, we winsorize the estimates at the 1% level, and finally we standardize the variables 
to have a zero mean and a standard deviation of one, within each survey date. In this construct, 
high optimism corresponds to high S&P 500 estimates. 
2.4.  Company and Market Data 
Throughout the analysis we use several databases with firm-level information. A detailed 
description of the variables is provided in Appendix A. First, we retrieve accounting data from 
Compustat, including industry classification (SIC), market leverage, asset market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, five-year sales growth, collateralized assets, net investments scaled by lagged 
assets, and indicator variables for repurchases and dividend payments.
11 We merge the survey 
                                                           
11 To ensure that our results are not driven by outliers and in keeping with the practice of many studies using similar 
data, we winsorize our survey data within each survey date at the 1% level. Similarly, we ensure that our corporate 
policy results are not driven by outliers by winsorizing the Compustat universe data by 1%. Our results remain 
qualitatively the same when we apply a tighter winsorization of 5%. 7 
 
observations with annual Compustat data, matching by the nearest fiscal end-of-year date. 
Second, we use CRSP to compute one-year past returns for firms. Third, we use Yahoo! for 
historical S&P 500 prices and for Volatility Index (VIX) data.
12 
2.5. Summary  Statistics 
In Table 1, Panels A through D, we present summary statistics for survey responses and 
the characteristics of the respondent firms. Panel A presents a broad profile of the sample (firm 
data are for non-utilities and non-financial firms). The annual revenue of the average (median) 
firm is $7.8bn ($2.1bn). The average (median) asset market-to-book ratio (M/B) is 1.70 (1.38). 
Profitability (operating profit scaled by lagged total assets) averages 10.7% and investment 
intensity (net investments scaled by lagged total assets) averages 8.4%. 60.1% of the firms pay 
dividends and 42.8% repurchase their own shares. 
Panel B presents a sample breakdown by industry and revenues. The panel shows the 
breakdown for the full sample, the subsample of respondents from public firms, and the 
subsample of identified firms (all of which are public firms). The panel demonstrates that 
industry composition is similar in the full sample and the identified sample. The breakdown by 
revenue suggests that public firms in our sample are larger than the private firms, and that the 
firms that could be identified are larger on average than those that could not be identified. 
In Panel C we compare the attributes of the portion of our sample for which we have 
Compustat data to the attributes of the pooled population of Compustat firms between 2001 and 
2009. Overall, our sample firms are larger than most Compustat firms: 62.2% are from the top 
sales quintile of Compustat firms. By oversampling large firms, our sample captures the 
important players in the economy. For other characteristics such as market-to-book ratio, past 
sales growth, and debt leverage, the variables for our sample firms have central tendencies 
similar to the universe of Compustat firms. Overall, based on the portion of our respondents that 
we can link to Compustat, our sample appears to over-represent large. Our results should 
therefore be interpreted with this in mind. 
One might wonder whether the key variables of interest, optimism and miscalibration, 
affect the likelihood of a CFO responding to our survey, or whether they are somehow related to 
                                                           
12 VIX is an index that reflects the average of imputed volatility across traded options in the S&P 500 futures index, 
traded on the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE). 8 
 
the likelihood that we can identify a firm and include it in our analysis. For example, perhaps 
CFOs are more likely to respond to a survey if they are optimistic or their firms are performing 
particularly well. As we next describe, we do not find evidence that this is problematic in our 
survey sample. First, Panel C shows that the past five-year sales growth for our sample firms is 
representative of historic sales growth for Compustat firms. Second, Panel D presents our key 
variables at different subsamples. Optimism appears as statistically constant across subsamples 
(i.e., full sample, public firms sample, and identified firms sample). Third, the economic 
variation in miscalibration across different subsamples of firms suggests that CFOs in larger 
firms are less miscalibrated. This facts runs counter to the concern that miscalibrated CFOs are 
more likely to appear in our sample of identified firms. 
In sum, while it is not possible to eliminate all possible concerns about sample 
representativeness, we do not find the variation in key variables that is symptomatic of deep 
problems with our sample. We also show in Panel C that, to the extent that we detect a pattern in 
the sample, it is concentrated in our ability to better access forecasts of executives large firms, 
which is the direction of bias one would prefer if the objective is to understand the operation of 
firms that are the dominant players in the economy. 
 
3.  Are CFOs Miscalibrated? 
In this section we use three methods to assess whether CFO respondents are, on average, 
miscalibrated.
13 The first method compares CFOs’ imputed individual volatilities to historical 
volatility distributions. The second method measures the fraction of ex post S&P 500 return 
realizations that fall between the 10
th and 90
th percentiles provided by CFOs’ predictions. In the 
third method, we compare CFOs’ imputed individual volatility to realized S&P 500 volatility and 
to the volatility implied in S&P 500 options (as measured by the VIX index). 
                                                           
13 There could be two reasons for CFO miscalibration (overconfidence). First, as discussed in the introduction, 
previous studies in psychology have almost unanimously shown that people, and professionals in particular, are 
overconfident on average. The second reason depends on a compelling argument made by Goel and Thakor (2008). 
They posit that top executives should be expected to be overconfident because promotion in corporations is typically 
based on past performance, which is ultimately tied to the risk taken by executives. Overconfident managers 
underestimate risk and therefore take excessively risky actions. As a consequence, the variance of outcomes from 
their actions is greater and overconfident managers will therefore be over-represented among the right-tail “winners” 
and be more likely to get promoted. 9 
 
3.1.  Method I: Historical Volatility Distributions 
First, we begin by eyeballing the distribution of historical volatility and compare them to 
the distribution of imputed individual volatility. Figure 2a plots the distribution of historical 
volatility computed in a one-year rolling window from 1950 until 2000.
14 The figure shows that 
the distribution is centered around 12%, and that most of the distribution lies between 8% and 
20%. In Figure 2b we present the distribution of the individual volatility imputed from the CFOs’ 
forecasts. The figure shows that imputed individual volatilities are centered around 4%, and that 
most of the distribution lies between 1% and 15%. Eighty-one percent of the imputed individual 
volatilities of CFOs are lower than 8%, the lower bound of historical volatility in the 50 years 
prior to the sample.  
The results for long-term volatility are even more pronounced. In Figures 3a and 3b, the 
dispersion between the historical 10-year annualized volatility distribution (Figures 3a) and the 
distribution of imputed individual volatility ( Figures 3b)  is notable, indicating an aggregate 
underestimation of volatility by managers. 
3.2.  Method II: Ex Ante Predictions vs. Ex Post Realizations 
In this test we assess the extent of CFO miscalibration by comparing the predictions of 
CFOs to the S&P 500 return realizations. Specifically, we compute the percentage of executives 
for whom the realized return of the stock market falls within their 80% confidence intervals 
(based the survey responses of 10
th and 90
th percentiles). If executives are well-calibrated and our 
sample period is representative, we expect this figure to be 80%. 
Table 2 presents the response statistics per survey. In Panel A we list the survey means 
for the lower confidence bound (Column (1)), expected returns (Column (2)), and upper 
confidence bound (Column (3)) for the one-year forecasts. In Column (4) we present the survey 
mean of the imputed individual volatilities; each is computed using Equation (2). Column (5) 
contains the disagreement volatility (dispersion of beliefs), which is calculated as the standard 
deviation of expected returns across all respondents for any given date. Finally, we report market 
data in Columns (6) to (10): realized returns for the year preceding the survey date and following 
the survey date, and volatility realized over the year preceding and following the survey date, as 
                                                           
14 S&P 500 return data is available in Yahoo! since 1950. We limit the sample used to compute distribution to the 
pre-survey period. 10 
 
well as the VIX on the survey date, respectively. In Panel B we present the corresponding 
statistics for the ten-year forecasts (without market data, due to the long horizon). 
Table 3 compares the S&P 500 return forecasts to realizations. In Column (1) we 
calculate the average forecast error (the difference between the mean expected returns from 
Table 2, Panel A, Column (2), and the actual S&P 500 return realization in Table 2, Panel A, 
Column (7)). The mean forecast error is 4.8%, suggesting that CFOs were optimistic over the 
period. This result is primarily driven by the financial crisis of 2008. 
We judge whether CFOs are miscalibrated by examining whether ex post market 
realizations fall in the ex ante confidence intervals. In Columns (2) to (4) of Table 3 we compute 
for each survey cohort the percentage of CFOs for whom the S&P 500 realization was in the 
80% confidence interval. Over the sample period, only 32.8% (Column (3)) of the stock market 
return realizations are within the 80% confidence bounds estimated by CFOs (illustrated also in 
Figure 1). This degree of miscalibration is consistent with other studies that request that 
respondents estimate 80% confidence bounds (Lichtenstein, Fischoff, and Phillips 1982, Russo 
and Schoemaker 1992, Klayman, Soll, Gonzales, Vallejo, and Barlas 1999, Soll and Klayman 
2004). Even in “quiet” stock market periods (between 2001 and 2006, or 2003 and 2006), the 
percent of stock market return realizations falling in the 80% confidence interval did not exceed 
59%. Thus, CFOs as a group appear to be miscalibrated in our sample. 
3.3.  Method III: Realized Volatility and the Forward Looking Volatility Index (VIX) 
Another possibility is to benchmark managers’ imputed individual volatilities to realized 
volatility and to option implied volatility (the latter captured in the Volatility Index (VIX)). In 
Table 2, Columns (9) and (10), we report the realized S&P 500 volatility over the year following 
the survey date, and the VIX for each survey date, respectively. The table shows that, for every 
survey date, both realized return volatility and the VIX are significantly higher than is the 
individual volatility imputed from CFOs’ predictions. While the average imputed individual 
volatility of the forecasters is 5.3%, the average realized return volatility is 19.5%, and the 
average VIX during the period was 21.3%.
15 
                                                           
15 We note that there is a mismatch between the horizons of the VIX and the imputed individual volatility. While the 
VIX reflects S&P 500 options’ implied volatility over a 30-day horizon, the imputed individual volatility reflects 
one year volatility expectations. Nonetheless, the overall evidence indicates that executives are miscalibrated on 
average. 11 
 
4.  Determinants of Forecasts and Miscalibration 
In this section we explore the determinants of miscalibration. Our goal is to better 
understand the mechanism through which executives use available information when forming 
their predictions.  
4.1.  How Well Can CFOs Predict Future Returns? 
  While the CFOs might be miscalibrated in terms of having imputed individual volatilities 
to be much lower than reasonable benchmarks, they might be very good at forecasting the market 
return. To test this possibility, Panel A of Table 4 examines whether executive forecasts have 
any predictive power. We regress the survey the average lower bound, expected return, upper 
bound, and individual volatility on future S&P 500 returns (separated for positive and negative 
returns). Because the forecasting periods overlap, we use the Newey-West (1987) correction for 
the standard errors with 4 quarterly lags. The results show that executive forecasts are negatively 
correlated with outcomes. Following surveys in which CFOs anticipate a high lower bound (i.e., 
low returns are not anticipated), lower returns are more likely to occur. While the effect occurs 
for the lower and upper bounds, and expected returns,
16 the relation is the strongest for the lower 
bound of returns. 
4.2.   Time Variation and Asymmetric Extrapolation of Past Market Returns 
We continue our investigation of the determinants of miscalibration by considering the 
historical information available to executives. When they attempt to predict future S&P 500 
returns, it seems plausible that CFOs might take into account the realized returns over the past 
year.
17 Soll and Klayman (2004) propose a similar idea: that miscalibration may result from an 
attempt on the part of forecasters to recall recent extreme realizations in order to establish 
confidence bounds. 
                                                           
16 We note that this relation is not driven by the financial crisis of 2008 and is strong in the earlier period. 
17 Other research points to past performance affecting predictions about own future performance. In models by 
Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) and Van den Steen (2004) decision makers “learn” about their decision making ability 
by observing the outcomes of past decisions, while ignoring exogenous determinants of these outcomes. Following 
favorable outcomes, decision makers become more confident about their judgment through a self-attribution 
mechanism, even if the outcome was independent of their prior decisions. In applying this idea to trading behavior, 
Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that traders become overconfident after observing a series of past successes that 
they then attribute to their own abilities. As an extension of this reasoning, Hilary and Menzly (2006) find that 
security analysts exhibit greater aggressiveness following success in predicting earnings. 12 
 
Table 4, Panel B, explores the relation between the one-year survey forecasts (separated 
for the average lower bound, expected return, upper bound, and imputed individual volatility) 
and past S&P 500 return realizations.
18 Also in this analysis, we average the different variables 
within survey date, and adjust the standard errors using the Newey-West (1987) procedure (we 
allow for 8 overlapping periods in the dependent and independent variables). Column (4) shows 
that individual volatility exhibits a V-shape with respect to past returns: it increases following 
both positive and negative past market returns. However, it is twice as sensitive to negative past 
returns than it is to positive past returns.  
To understand the mechanism through which this relation occurs, we examine the 
sensitivity of the different forecasts that executives provide to past returns. Columns (1) to (3) of 
Panel B show that the lower bound (“worst case scenario”) is especially sensitive to poor past 
returns. To illustrate, following a decline of 10% in stock market returns, the average lower 
bound that CFOs provide is lower by 0.2% than otherwise. The upper bound increases following 
low returns, but only by a modest degree; a 10% decline in stock market returns translates to 
upper bound higher by 0.04%. Past returns explain the lower bound very well the variation in the 
average lower bound variable (adjusted R
2 = 0.70). Explanatory power is much poorer for 
average upper bound (adjusted R
2 = 0.02). Importantly, both the lower and upper bounds, as well 
as expected returns, are insensitive to past positive returns.  
These results are consistent with the model of Gervais and Odean (2001) and with the 
experimental evidence of Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch (1991) and Soll and Klayman (2004), 
who argue that forecasters rely heavily on past extreme cases to estimate the distribution of 
uncertain variables. The lower confidence bound is particularly sensitive to past returns, perhaps 
because managers tend to focus on downside risk in their analysis (Arnold 1986, March and 
Shapira 1987, Kahneman and Lovallo 1993). 
4.3.   Past Own-Firm Returns 
Next, we test whether CFO stock market forecasts are influenced by idiosyncratic past 
returns of their own firms (i.e., the part of their firm’s return unrelated to overall market returns). 
In these regressions (Table 4, Panel C), we face cross-sectional correlation (executives forecast 
                                                           
18 For reasons of brevity we present only the analysis of one-year forecasts. Ten-year forecasts exhibit similar 
patterns. Results are available upon request. 13 
 
the same index) and overlapping data problems (forecasting horizon is one year and observations 
are quarterly). We address the issue by using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach in which 
we perform cross-sectional regressions of forecasts on past one-year firm returns. Then, we 
compute the mean of the regressions’ coefficients and adjust the standard errors with the Newey 
and West (1987) procedure for eight lags (to allow for the overlap in the forward looking 
forecasts and the historical returns). This procedure is also advantageous because it implicitly 
demeans firm returns each quarter, so that the effects reflected in the regressions in Panel C are 
orthogonal to the market-wide effects depicted in the regressions in Panel B.  
The table shows that although CFOs’ forecasts are linked to own-firm performance, the 
association is relatively weak. The results suggest that the lower return bounds provided by 
CFOs are associated with their own firms’ past positive returns (Column (1)). The stronger the 
idiosyncratic past returns are, the more miscalibrated the forecaster (Column (4)). Comparing the 
results in Panel B to those in Panel C, we note that the effect of past market-wide returns on the 
confidence bounds is larger by an order of magnitude, relative to the effect of past firm-specific 
returns. 
4.4. Personal  Characteristics 
We also examine the personal determinants of CFO miscalibration. In two surveys 
(2003Q4 and 2004Q1) we asked executives to report some of their demographic characteristics. 
Specifically, executives reported their age, years of professional experience, education level, 
gender, and the proportion of their incentive pay. We use these variables with the intent of 
discovering whether they can explain the variation in miscalibration and optimism. To ensure 
that these characteristics do not capture industry-level variation, we control for the fixed effects 
of the 10-industries reported by executives. 
The results in Table 5 suggest that miscalibration increases with age, but decreases with 
incentive pay. Optimism, on the other hand, increases with experience and for men; it decreases 
with age. 
4.5.  The Persistence of Miscalibration 
Another important aspect of miscalibration is whether it persists over time. To explore 
this issue, we examine the responses of repeat respondents. Across surveys, there are 1,622 pairs 14 
 
of sequential responses that we can identify as coming from the same executives. For these 
observations, the correlation between sequential Miscalibration ST (Miscalibration LT) is 0.57 
(0.28), and the correlation between sequential Optimism ST (Optimism LT) is 0.37 (0.33). Hence, 
both miscalibration and optimism persist over time for a given CFO. These results are consistent 
with evidence about the stability of individual biases over time (Jonsson and Allwood 2003, 
Glaser, Langer and Weber 2005). 
We test for the joint influence of the persistence of miscalibration and optimism and 
CFOs’ learning from new data. In Table 6 we regress current miscalibration and optimism 
variables on lagged values (the most recent observation of the same executive), in addition to the 
returns on the stock market in the preceding year. The regressions show that past miscalibration 
and optimism are the strongest explanatory variables for the current variables. Nevertheless, 
executives “update” their traits following new data. For example, CFOs become less 
miscalibrated following poor stock market returns. Furthermore, optimism exhibits a V-shape 
pattern with respect to past returns: CFOs are less optimistic following both large good and bad 
market returns. 
 
5.  Miscalibration and Corporate Finance 
  In the previous sections we documented that CFO forecasts are miscalibrated on average. 
In this section we investigate whether this miscalibration affects corporate views or policies. We 
focus on two relevant areas. First, we examine the relation between the miscalibration of S&P 
500 returns and miscalibration concerning own-firm returns. Second, we examine the effects of 
executive miscalibration on corporate investment. 
5.1.  Miscalibration Regarding Own-Firm Projects 
An important question is whether miscalibration with respect to S&P 500 return 
predictions is related to miscalibration in other areas in which executives make estimates. We 
test this issue by querying executives about their firms’ expected internal rate of returns (IRRs), 15 
 
including confidence bounds, and examining the correlation between CFOs’ S&P 500 
miscalibration to the miscalibration imputed from their own firms’ IRR.
19  
To implement this test, we ask CFOs in the 2007Q2 survey to provide mean estimates 
and 10
th and 90
th percentiles for the return distributions of their own firms’ investments in the 
following year: 
For the investments that your company makes this year, what do you expect the 
internal rate of return (IRR) to be? 
- There is a 1-in-10 chance that the actual IRR will be less than ___% 
- I expect the IRR to be ___% 
- There is a 1-in-10 chance that the actual IRR will be greater than ___% 
In addition, we survey respondents about the degree to which they personally affect 
investment decisions in their firms on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (a lot). 
We transform the responses for the IRR question to an own-firm miscalibration measure 
(MiscalibrationIRR) according to the procedure used in Section 2.2. As with the S&P 500-based 
miscalibration variables, this variable reflects the standardized perceived volatility of own-firm 
investment returns. 
Next, we test whether MiscalibrationIRR is correlated with our S&P 500-based 
miscalibration variables. Such a correlation would suggest that our primary miscalibration 
variables are reasonable proxies for own-firm miscalibration (which is relevant when linking 
                                                           
19 An extensive literature in both psychology and experimental economics examines whether biases like 
overconfidence transcend domain. West and Stanovich (1997) find that overconfidence regarding motor skills is 
correlated with overconfidence regarding cognitive skills. Glaser and Weber (2007) present a study in which 
overconfidence is measured in several ways, such as by different types of miscalibration questions. The authors find 
that respondents who exhibit overconfidence in stock market forecasts are likely to exhibit overconfidence in 
general knowledge questions. Several studies document that individual degrees of overconfidence are stable within 
tasks (forecasting, in our case), e.g., Glaser, Langer, and Weber (2005), Klayman, Soll, Gonzales, Vallejo, and 
Barlas (1999), Jonsson and Allwood (2003). These studies show that while people sometimes exhibit different levels 
of overconfidence across domains, their relative ranking also varies, as expected. While many studies find that 
overconfidence crosses from one domain to another, others find either a weak carryover effect or none at all. For 
example, Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget (2005) find that although in there is some evidence that 
overconfidence carries over across domains (subjects that are classified as miscalibrated perform worse in a trading 
game), in other cases, the link does not exist (there is no relation between miscalibration score and trading volume). 
Carryover effects are found also in economics: Puri and Robinson (2007) find that people with optimistic beliefs 
about their lifespan also make optimistic economic decisions, e.g., they are more likely to be self-employed and tilt 
their portfolios towards individual stocks. 16 
 
miscalibration to own-firm policies). The pairwise correlation between the S&P 500 short-term 
miscalibration variable and the IRR miscalibration variable is high: 0.43. In Table 7, Column (1), 
MiscalibrationIRR is regressed on the S&P 500-based short-term and long-term miscalibration 
variables, the S&P 500-based optimism variables, and industry controls. The results indicate that 
firm-based miscalibration is significantly correlated with S&P 500-based miscalibration. IRR-
based miscalibration has a strong sensitivity of 0.373 (t = 4.3) for short-term S&P 500-based 
miscalibration. The effect is stronger for executives who are more involved in investment 
decisions (Column (2)). Hence, the S&P 500 based miscalibration variable is a reasonable proxy 
for own-firm miscalibration. 
5.2. Corporate  Investment 
We next examine whether miscalibrated executives make bold decisions. We investigate 
this prediction by examining whether the firms of biased executives invest more. Investment is a 
particularly important policy because it is a “real” outcome. We hypothesize that corporate 
investment should be higher for companies run by executives who are (1) miscalibrated, (2) 
optimistic, and (3) miscalibrated and optimistic. 
To test these hypotheses, we regress investment intensity, computed as net investments 
scaled by total assets, on miscalibration, optimism variables, and firm controls. The results are 
presented in Table 8. The table shows that firm investment increases with both miscalibration 
and optimism. The relation is especially strong for the long-term miscalibration and optimism 
variables, which is expected given that corporate investment has a long-term effect on the firm. 
This effect is relatively strong: firms run by executives who have long-term miscalibration or 
optimism that is one standard deviation higher than the average invest 0.7%, or 1.1%, 
respectively, more each year (Column (4)). This effect is economically significant given that the 
average (median) investment intensity in the sample is 8.8% (5.4%). Of particular interest, the 
interaction term between miscalibration and optimism is significant (Columns (2) and (4)); the 
combined effect of an increase of one standard deviation in miscalibration and optimism on 
investment intensity is 2.0%.
20 This indicates that biases in the first (optimism) and second 
(miscalibration) moment of belief reinforce one another when it comes to corporate decision 
                                                           
20The net effect is determined by adding up the coefficients: 0.7 + 1.1 + 0.2 = 2.0% (Column (4)). 17 
 
making. In other words, this evidence is consistent with optimistic executives investing even 
more when they underestimate future volatility. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Over the past nine years, we collected over 11,600 S&P 500 forecasts as well as 80% 
confidence intervals from Chief Financial Officers. The width of the confidence interval gives us 
a measure of miscalibration. Importantly, the CFOs are forecasting a common market-wide 
measure. This allows us to exploit cross-sectional heterogeneity in both optimism and 
miscalibration. By comparing forecasts to realizations over many periods, we also present a 
simple measure of miscalibration.  
We use several methods to show that CFOs are, on average, severely miscalibrated – 
their confidence intervals are far too narrow. For example, the 80% confidence interval contains 
only 33% of the realized returns. Because of our rich panel data, we can identify some of the 
factors behind this behavior. In particular, we find that miscalibration is less severe following 
periods of poor returns because the lower bound of the confidence interval (“worst case 
scenario”) is very sensitive to past returns. Furthermore, we document that miscalibration is 
highly persistent and does not change much in light of new information. We find that 
miscalibration is more severe with age and it is less severe among executives with high incentive 
pay. 
We find evidence that CFO miscalibration is important for decision making. We show 
that the miscalibration measure, based on predicting the S&P 500 returns, is highly correlated 
with the miscalibration measure based on predicting own-firm project returns. Furthermore, 
firms with miscalibrated or optimistic executives invest more on average; this effect is 
significantly stronger for firms in which executives are both miscalibrated and optimistic. 
  Overall, our results shed new light on the biases in corporate forecasts and beliefs, which 
have important implications for corporate finance. Our study implies that miscalibration is an 
important bias, one that ought to be part of mainstream research in corporate finance.  18 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions  
Variables from CFO Survey 
One (Ten) year estimate: lower bound 
(%) 
Survey response for the level of S&P 500 returns in which there is a 1-
in-10 chance of being lower. Applies to short-term (one-year) and long-
term (ten-year) returns. 
One (Ten) year estimate: expected value 
(%) 
Survey response for the (average) expected return of S&P 500. Applies 
to short-term (one-year) and long-term (ten-year) returns. 
One (Ten) year estimate: upper bound 
(%) 
Survey response for the level of S&P 500 returns in which there is a 1-
in-10 chance of being higher. Applies to short-term (one-year) and long-
term (ten-year) returns. 
One (Ten) year estimate: imputed 
individual volatility (%) 
    
                                     
 .     1 . Applies to short-term 
(one-year) and long-term (ten-year) forecasts. 
Miscalibration ST (LT)  Standardized imputed individual volatility: we subtract the mean within 
each survey date and divide by the standard deviation within the survey 
date. 
Applies to short-term (one-year) and long-term (ten-year) forecasts. 
Disagreement volatility (%)  Standard deviation of mean forecasts (expected returns) within survey 
date. Applies to short-term (one-year) and long-term (ten-year) 
forecasts. 
Optimism ST (LT)  Standardized expected returns: we subtract the mean within each survey 
date and divide by the standard deviation within the survey date. 
Applies to short-term (one-year) and long-term (ten-year) forecasts. 
Forecast error (%)  One year expected S&P 500 return minus the realized S&P 500 return 
for the same period. 
IRR estimate: lower bound (%)  Survey response for the level of internal rate of return (IRR) in which 
there is a 1-in-10 chance of being lower. Question was asked in 2007Q2 
survey. 
IRR estimate: expected value (%)  Survey response for the (average) expected internal rate of return (IRR). 
Question was asked in 2007Q2 survey. 
IRR estimate: upper bound (%)  Survey response for the level of internal rate of return (IRR) in which 
there is a 1-in-10 chance of being higher. Question was asked in 2007Q2 
survey. 
MiscalibrationIRR      
                                           
 .     1 . The measure is 
standardized: we subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation. 
Age  Response to question about the respondent’s age: 
(1) <=39, (2) 40-49, (3) 50-59, (4) 60+ 
Professional experience  Response to question about the respondent’s number of years serving as 
a financial executive: 
(1) <= 4 years, (2) 4-9 years, (3) 10-14 years, (4) 15+ 
Education  Response to question about the respondent’s education: 
(1) High School, (2) Some college, (3) College degree, (4) MBA or 
other, (5) Non-business masters, (6) =>Masters 
Gender  Response to question about the respondent’s gender:  
(0) Female, (1) Male 22 
 
Proportion of incentives  Response to the question: Approximately what portion of your 
compensation is incentive based? (e.g., stock option, bonus, etc.): 
(1) =< 10%, (2) 10-19%, (3) 20-29%, (4) 30-39%, (5) 40-49%, (6) 
50%+ 
Involved in investments  Response to the question: To what degree do you personally affect the 
investment decisions of your firm? 
(1) Not at all, to (7) A lot 
 
Variables from Annual Compustat 
Market leverage  Total debt / total assets at market values = (long-term debt (item 9) + 
debt in current liabilities (item 34)) / (share price (item 199) * #shares 
(item 54) + debt in current liabilities (item 34) + long-term debt (item 9) 
+ preferred-liquidation value (item 10) - deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit (item 35)). 
log(Sales)  Logged annual sales in millions of USD (item 12). 
Asset market-to-book (M/B)  Total assets at market values / total assets at book values = (share price 
(item 199) * #shares (item 54) + debt in current liabilities (item 34) + 
long-term debt (item 9) + preferred-liquidation value (item 10) - 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item 35)) / total assets (item 6). 
Profitability  Operating profit (item 13) / lag(total assets (item 6)). 
Repurchases  1 if repurchased common and preferred stock (item 115) is greater than 
1% of equity, and zero otherwise.  
Dividends  1 if declared dividends (item 21), and 0 otherwise. 
Collateral  Tangible assets / total assets at book values = (plant property & 
equipment (item 8) + inventory (item 3)) / total assets (item 6). 
Investment intensity  Net investments / lag(total assets at book values) = (capital expenditures 
(item 128) + increase in investments (item 113) + acquisitions (item 
129) - sales of property, plant and equipment (item 107) - sale of 
investments (item 109)) / lag(total assets (item 6)). 
Long-term debt / Total debt  Portion of long-term debt (item 9) out of total debt (item 9 + item 34).  
 
Variables from CRSP 
12-month cumulative returns  Cumulative value-weighted firm monthly returns over 12 months.  
 
Variables from Yahoo! 
12-month S&P 500 returns  S&P 500 returns, accumulated over 12 months. 
12-month S&P 500 volatility  S&P 500 volatility, computed over 12 months using daily data. 
VIX  An index for the implied volatility on 30-day options. The index is 
constructed by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) from a 
wide range of wide range of S&P 500 (S&P 100 until August 2003) 
index options (both calls and puts). The index reflects the anticipated 
volatility in the next 30 days.  
See http://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf for further details. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
The table presents descriptive statistics of the sample firms. Panel A presents summary statistics for the variables 
used in the study. Panel B presents an industry and revenue breakdown according to the CFOs’ own reporting. Panel 
C compares the distribution of key attributes of the sample firms to those from the Compustat universe from 2001 to 
2009. The columns represent Compustat quintiles, and the numbers report the percentage of sample observations 
that fall within each quintile. Panel D presents means of key variables across different subsamples. For brevity, the 
number of observations and standard errors in Panel D are for the variable Miscalibration ST (statistics for other 
variables are largely similar). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: Sample Summary Statistics 
 
S&P 500 return forecasts Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
One year return estimate: lower bound (%) 11681 -2.717 8.634 -50.00 0.00 30.00
One year return estimate: expected value (%) 11681 5.743 5.236 -35.00 5.00 80.00
One year return estimate: upper bound (%) 11681 11.701 7.262 -20.00 10.00 100.00
One year return estimate: imputed individual volatility (%) 11681 5.312 4.435 0.07 3.78 41.46
Ten year average return estimate: lower bound (%) 11353 2.388 4.921 -50.00 3.00 75.00
Ten year average return estimate: expected value (%) 11353 7.763 4.921 -25.00 7.00 90.00
Ten year average return estimate: upper bound (%) 11353 12.031 8.069 -10.00 10.00 100.00
Ten year average return estimate: imputed individual volatility (%) 11353 3.368 2.753 0.11 2.80 45.43
Market returns and volatility at survey dates Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
Past year S&P 500 returns (%) 36 -1.201 19.948 -43.42 4.72 50.04
Future year S&P 500 returns (%) 33 1.157 20.638 -47.23 5.86 46.81
Past year S&P 500 volatility (%) 36 19.738 10.188 9.52 18.23 45.37
Future year S&P 500 volatility (%) 33 19.501 10.783 9.52 17.55 45.30
VIX (%) 36 21.888 9.764 9.90 20.26 55.28
Survey variables Obs Mean Std Dev Min Median Max
MiscalibrationIRR 349 0.000 1.000 -7.26 0.21 1.48
Expected IRR (%) 349 13.276 6.108 2.00 12.00 40.00
Miscalibration ST 11681 0.000 0.999 -4.49 0.31 1.65
Miscalibration LT 11353 0.000 0.999 -6.29 0.27 1.86
Optimism ST 11681 0.000 0.999 -4.32 -0.03 3.41
Optimism LT 11353 0.000 0.999 -2.72 -0.07 6.87
Investment intensity 2591 8.785 13.327 -24.01 5.39 129.08
Market leverage 2700 17.568 16.787 0.00 13.31 88.09
Dividends 2703 0.601 0.490 0.00 1.00 1.00
Repurchases 2656 0.428 0.495 0.00 0.00 1.00
Asset Market-to-book 2700 1.699 1.084 0.22 1.38 19.69
Sales ($m) 2700 7789.336 12133.770 0.0 2135.9 49694.0
log(Sales ($m)) 2700 7.305 1.809 0.56 7.67 9.32
Profitability 2615 0.107 0.151 -1.11 0.11 0.60
Past year S&P 500 return (%) 2486 10.978 41.882 -98.65 9.43 409.23
Age 409 2.474 0.731 1.00 3.00 4.00
Experience 409 3.526 0.795 1.00 4.00 4.00
Education 409 3.748 0.743 3.00 4.00 6.00
Gender (male = 1) 409 0.946 0.226 0.00 1.00 1.00
Propertion of performance-based incentives 409 3.836 1.760 1.00 4.00 6.0024 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
Panel B: Distribution of Responses by Industry and Revenue Bracket 
 
 
Panel C: Distribution of Sample Observations Relative to the Compustat Universe  
 
 




Full Public Identified Full Public Identified
Industry sample sample sample Revenues sample sample sample
Retail / Wholesale 1501 316 274 Less than $25m 1342 207 106
Mining / Construction 520 116 94 $25m to $100m 2690 341 233
Manufacturing 3189 1089 853 $100m to $500m 3605 764 579
Transportation / Energy 673 286 234 $500m to $1bn 1187 496 394
Communications / Media 508 232 155 $1bn to $5bn 1786 1052 889
Tech (Software / Biotech) 712 328 218 Above $5bn 817 639 526
Banking / Finance / Insurance 1756 803 651
Service / Consulting 1026 250 201
Healthcare / Pharmaceutical 713 251 217
Other 1486 357 275
Total 12084 4028 3172 Total 11427 3499 2727
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Sales 3.2 5.6 8.9 20.1 62.2
Asset Market-to-Book 11.5 21.6 25.2 25.1 16.7
Profitability 5.7 18.4 25.2 27.5 23.1
5-year sales growth 13.2 26.6 27.0 20.1 13.1
Collateral 12.3 19.3 22.4 25.2 20.8
Market leverage 12.5 18.9 25.9 24.1 18.6
Long-term debt / Total debt 16.3 19.1 22.7 24.2 17.7
Investment intensity 11.9 19.2 25.9 26.9 16.2
Compustat quintiles
Standard Error
Sample N ST LT ST LT Miscalibration ST
Full sample 11681 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009
Public firms 3912 -0.055 -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 0.016
Identified firms 3093 -0.084 0.002 -0.021 -0.018 0.019
Revenue
Less than $100m 3819 0.039 0.004 -0.043 0.014 0.052
$100m to $1bn 4576 0.019 0.005 0.013 -0.009 0.034
Above $1bn 2514 -0.085 0.000 0.038 -0.002 0.029
Miscalibration Optimism25 
 
Table 2. S&P 500 Return Forecasts and Confidence Intervals 
The table presents summary statistics by survey date. Avg lower bound (%) is the average CFO 10
th percentile for 
one-year (Panel A) or ten-year (Panel B) S&P 500 returns. Avg one-year S&P 500 expected return (%) is the 
average CFO forecasts for one-year (Panel A) or ten-year (Panel B) S&P 500 returns. Avg upper bound (%) is 
average CFO 90
th percentile for one-year (Panel A) or ten-year (Panel B) S&P 500 returns. One-year (Ten-year) 
average individual volatility (%) is the average individual volatility imputed from respondents’ confidence intervals 
for the one-year (ten-year) S&P 500 forecasts. One-year (Ten-year) Disagreement volatility (%) is the standard 
deviation of point estimates for the one-year (ten-year) S&P 500 forecasts across respondents. 12-months past 
(future) S&P 500 returns (%) is the realized one-year S&P 500 return preceding (following) the survey date. 12-
months past (future) realized volatility is the annual volatility of the S&P 500 over the year preceding (following) 
the survey date measured with daily returns. VIX is the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility 
index, which reflects the average of imputed volatility across traded options on the S&P 500 (S&P 100 before 
August 2003) futures index. 
Panel A: One Year Forecasts and Market Data 
 
Avg Avg Avg Avg 12-month 12-month 12-month 12-month
lower expected upper individual Disagreement past S&P 500 future S&P 500 past realized future realized
bound return bound volatility volatility returns returns volatility volatility VIX
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Survey date Obs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
11 Jun 2001 144 -2.7 6.1 13.7 6.0 4.0 -14.6 -19.5 21.2 18.8 20.7
10 Sep 2001 136 -5.0 4.6 12.9 6.7 6.1 -26.3 -18.8 21.8 24.2 31.8
03 Dec 2001 188 -4.4 6.9 14.9 7.1 5.9 -15.8 -17.1 22.3 25.9 25.8
12 Mar 2002 171 -0.5 7.4 12.6 4.7 3.8 -7.8 -30.7 21.0 26.6 19.6
04 Jun 2002 313 -3.4 5.1 10.6 5.2 4.0 -17.1 -7.1 18.7 27.1 23.9
17 Sep 2002 346 -4.3 5.0 11.0 5.7 4.4 -14.0 16.2 23.7 21.7 38.0
03 Dec 2002 270 -2.2 6.8 12.7 5.4 4.1 -21.3 16.2 25.8 17.6 28.3
17 Mar 2003 180 -7.1 4.6 11.4 7.0 4.5 -26.3 29.9 27.0 14.1 31.8
12 Jun 2003 348 -1.7 7.9 14.6 5.9 5.4 -0.9 13.3 27.0 12.5 20.4
15 Sep 2003 147 1.1 7.9 12.8 4.2 3.8 16.2 10.9 21.7 11.6 19.3
04 Dec 2003 215 1.1 9.2 15.1 4.9 4.1 17.3 11.3 17.5 11.2 16.3
18 Mar 2004 201 -1.0 7.7 14.1 5.3 6.3 25.3 5.9 14.1 10.8 18.5
09 Jun 2004 170 -0.6 7.0 12.5 4.8 4.5 13.3 5.8 12.5 10.7 15.4
08 Sep 2004 176 -0.8 6.7 12.3 4.7 4.5 10.4 9.1 11.6 10.2 14.1
01 Dec 2004 281 -0.3 6.6 11.5 4.3 3.4 11.9 5.5 11.2 10.3 13.0
22 Feb 2005 265 -0.7 6.3 11.3 4.4 3.2 3.5 8.7 11.0 10.3 13.1
24 May 2005 302 -1.1 5.3 10.0 4.0 2.8 7.1 5.7 10.8 9.5 12.7
26 Aug 2005 302 -1.0 5.7 10.5 4.2 3.3 9.1 7.5 10.2 10.8 13.7
15 Nov 2005 333 -0.9 5.5 10.3 4.1 3.3 3.8 12.6 10.4 10.0 12.2
23 Feb 2006 258 -0.7 6.5 11.5 4.5 3.6 6.3 13.1 10.2 9.6 11.9
23 May 2006 468 -0.2 6.2 10.9 4.0 3.6 5.6 21.3 9.5 10.4 18.3
29 Aug 2006 433 -1.1 5.7 10.5 4.2 3.4 6.9 9.8 10.8 12.3 12.3
21 Nov 2006 374 -0.2 6.8 11.9 4.4 3.5 10.8 2.6 10.0 14.7 9.9
01 Mar 2007 363 0.3 7.1 12.0 4.2 3.6 8.8 -1.6 10.1 17.5 15.8
01 Jun 2007 393 0.2 7.4 12.3 4.4 3.6 19.3 -9.0 10.2 19.9 12.8
07 Sep 2007 460 -1.3 5.5 10.4 4.3 3.6 11.9 -14.9 12.7 20.6 26.2
30 Nov 2007 432 -3.1 4.8 10.0 4.9 4.3 6.0 -40.1 15.3 38.8 22.9
07 Mar 2008 384 -4.8 2.9 8.5 5.0 4.2 -8.0 -47.2 17.8 43.1 27.5
13 Jun 2008 370 -3.3 4.0 9.3 4.6 3.7 -11.2 -30.5 20.2 45.3 21.2
05 Sep 2008 409 -3.9 3.7 9.2 4.9 4.4 -14.4 -19.9 20.6 45.2 23.1
28 Nov 2008 534 -7.8 4.5 13.1 7.9 8.8 -39.1 23.9 38.8 30.6 55.3
26 Feb 2009 439 -10.2 2.0 10.8 8.1 7.7 -43.4 46.8 42.6 23.9 44.7
28 May 2009 427 -4.2 6.8 14.5 6.8 7.7 -35.2 18.4 45.4 17.9 31.7
10 Sep 2009 530 -3.6 6.6 13.9 6.4 7.4 -16.6 n/a 45.0 n/a 23.6
10 Dec 2009 441 -3.7 6.0 12.6 6.1 5.9 25.3 n/a 28.0 n/a 22.3
25 Feb 2010 478 -4.7 5.1 11.7 6.1 5.5 50.0 n/a 23.7 n/a 20.1
One-year forecasts Market data26 
 
Table 2. S&P 500 Return Forecasts and Confidence Intervals (Cont.) 
Panel B: Ten Year Forecasts 
 
  
Avg Avg Avg Avg
lower expected upper individual Disagreement
bound return bound volatility volatility
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Survey date Obs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
12 Mar 2002 160 3.6 8.5 12.6 3.2 2.6
04 Jun 2002 301 2.9 8.2 12.4 3.4 3.7
17 Sep 2002 339 3.1 8.1 12.2 3.2 3.1
03 Dec 2002 265 3.4 8.0 12.1 3.0 3.3
17 Mar 2003 176 1.9 7.4 11.5 3.4 2.4
12 Jun 2003 341 1.8 7.7 12.4 3.8 4.0
15 Sep 2003 141 3.3 7.5 10.7 2.6 2.0
04 Dec 2003 211 3.4 8.3 12.1 3.1 2.7
18 Mar 2004 197 2.8 7.8 12.1 3.2 2.4
09 Jun 2004 168 3.1 8.0 11.6 3.0 3.1
08 Sep 2004 168 2.6 7.7 11.4 3.1 3.0
01 Dec 2004 272 3.2 7.7 11.3 2.9 3.1
22 Feb 2005 260 3.2 7.7 11.6 2.9 3.9
24 May 2005 291 2.5 7.6 11.8 3.2 5.2
26 Aug 2005 294 2.1 7.4 11.2 3.3 2.4
15 Nov 2005 318 2.3 7.1 11.3 3.1 3.2
23 Feb 2006 253 2.1 7.2 11.3 3.2 2.4
23 May 2006 456 3.0 7.9 12.2 3.2 4.0
29 Aug 2006 416 2.6 7.8 12.2 3.3 4.5
21 Nov 2006 360 2.8 8.0 12.4 3.3 4.2
01 Mar 2007 351 2.7 7.9 12.1 3.3 3.1
01 Jun 2007 381 3.1 8.0 11.9 3.1 3.3
07 Sep 2007 440 3.4 8.3 12.4 3.1 5.2
30 Nov 2007 415 2.9 8.0 12.2 3.2 3.8
07 Mar 2008 364 3.5 8.8 13.2 3.2 7.9
13 Jun 2008 357 2.3 7.9 12.6 3.5 5.8
05 Sep 2008 390 2.4 7.7 11.9 3.3 4.5
28 Nov 2008 501 1.9 7.8 12.5 3.7 5.5
26 Feb 2009 418 1.3 8.2 13.5 4.3 6.9
28 May 2009 404 1.3 7.3 11.6 3.7 5.0
10 Sep 2009 513 0.9 7.7 12.6 4.0 9.0
10 Dec 2009 427 0.7 7.0 11.4 3.8 5.8
25 Feb 2010 455 0.2 7.0 11.9 4.1 6.0
Ten-year forecasts27 
 
Table 3. One-Year S&P 500 Return Forecasts vs. Realizations 
The table compares survey forecasts with S&P 500 realizations by survey date. Average forecast error (%) is 
defined as Average one-year S&P 500 expected return (%) minus Realized one-year S&P 500 return (%). S&P 500 
realizations: % below 10
th percentile is the percentage of respondents for whom the realized one-year S&P 500 
return is below their 10
th percentile predictions. S&P 500 realizations: % between 10
th and 90
th percentiles is the 
percentage of respondents for whom the realized one-year S&P 500 return is between their 10
th percentile and 90
th 
percentile predictions. S&P 500 realizations: % above 90
th percentile is the percentage of respondents for whom the 
realized one-year S&P 500 return is above their 90
th percentile predictions. 
 






(%) percentile percentiles percentile
Survey date (1) (2) (3) (4)
11 Jun 2001 25.6 96.5 3.5 0.0
10 Sep 2001 23.4 89.0 11.0 0.0
03 Dec 2001 24.0 90.4 9.6 0.0
12 Mar 2002 38.1 100.0 0.0 0.0
04 Jun 2002 12.2 73.5 26.5 0.0
17 Sep 2002 -11.2 0.0 14.5 85.5
03 Dec 2002 -9.4 0.0 20.4 79.6
17 Mar 2003 -25.3 0.0 2.8 97.2
12 Jun 2003 -5.4 0.3 50.3 49.4
15 Sep 2003 -3.1 0.0 57.1 42.9
04 Dec 2003 -2.1 0.9 67.9 31.2
18 Mar 2004 1.9 11.4 83.6 5.0
09 Jun 2004 1.2 10.0 89.4 0.6
08 Sep 2004 -2.5 1.7 67.0 31.3
01 Dec 2004 1.1 8.5 81.9 9.6
22 Feb 2005 -2.4 1.1 67.9 30.9
24 May 2005 -0.4 3.6 83.1 13.2
26 Aug 2005 -1.8 1.0 69.9 29.1
15 Nov 2005 -7.2 0.0 20.7 79.3
23 Feb 2006 -6.6 0.4 31.8 67.8
23 May 2006 -15.0 0.0 3.8 96.2
29 Aug 2006 -4.1 0.7 52.9 46.4
21 Nov 2006 4.2 40.4 59.6 0.0
01 Mar 2007 8.7 75.8 24.2 0.0
01 Jun 2007 16.4 83.5 16.5 0.0
07 Sep 2007 20.4 93.5 6.5 0.0
30 Nov 2007 44.9 99.5 0.5 0.0
07 Mar 2008 50.2 100.0 0.0 0.0
13 Jun 2008 34.6 99.7 0.3 0.0
05 Sep 2008 23.6 93.9 6.1 0.0
28 Nov 2008 -19.4 0.2 18.4 81.5
26 Feb 2009 -44.8 0.0 1.8 98.2
28 May 2009 -11.7 0.5 31.4 68.1
Average 2001-2006 1.5 23.0 42.4 34.6
Average 6/2003-11/2006 -2.8 5.3 59.1 35.5
Average All 4.8 35.6 32.8 31.6
S&P 500 realizations28 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Forecasts and Individual Volatilities 
The table explores the determinants of CFO forecasts of the one-year-ahead S&P 500 return and imputed individual 
volatilities. Panel A presents regressions of lower bounds, expected returns, upper bounds, and individual volatilities 
on future S&P 500 returns and past returns, where standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation 
using the Newey and West (1987) procedure with 4 lags. Observation units in Panels A and B are the means of 
survey responses within a given quarter. The regressions in Panels A and B are weighted by the square root of the 
number of observations. Panel C presents results from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. In Panels B and C, 
standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) procedure with 8 
lags. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Average Forecasts and Future S&P 500 Returns and Volatility 
 
Panel B: Average Forecasts and Past S&P 500 Returns and Volatility 
 
Average Average Average Average
Lower Expected Upper Individual
bound return bound volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
max(0, 12-month future S&P 500 return) -0.212*** -0.091*** -0.018 0.089***
(0.035) (0.019) (0.016) (0.027)
min(0, 12-month future S&P 500 return) 0.125*** 0.083*** 0.056* -0.027**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.013)
Intercept 0.569 7.371*** 12.334*** 3.444***
(0.508) (0.407) (0.587) (0.351)
Observations 33 33 33 33
Adj. R
2 0.556 0.413 0.094 0.266
One-year forecasts (%)
Average Average Average Average
Lower Expected Upper Individual
bound return bound volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
max(0, 12-month past S&P 500 return) -0.053 0.004 0.040 0.058***
(0.039) (0.033) (0.034) (0.010)
min(0, 12-month past S&P 500 return) 0.188*** 0.054*** -0.038* -0.111***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021) (0.017)
Intercept -0.446 6.329*** 11.190*** 3.225***
(0.386) (0.547) (0.717) (0.216)
Observations 36 36 36 36
Adj. R
2 0.702 0.183 0.019 0.623
One-year forecasts (%)29 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Forecasts and Individual Volatilities (Cont.) 




Lower Expected Upper Individual
bound return bound volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
max(0, 12-month past own firm return) 0.024*** 0.007* 0.001 -0.000***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000)
min(0, 12-month past own firm return) 0.001 0.002 -0.005 -0.000
(0.017) (0.006) (0.018) (0.000)
12-month past own firm return volatility -0.001 -0.013* -0.020* -0.000
(0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.000)
Intercept -2.715*** 6.495*** 12.756*** 0.056***
(0.656) (0.468) (0.524) (0.003)
Average number of observations 78.9 78.9 78.9 78.9
Number of regressions 29 29 29 29
Average R
2 0.041 0.047 0.046 0.044
One-year forecasts (%)30 
 
Table 5. Miscalibration and Personal Characteristics 
The table explores whether miscalibration and optimism are determined by personal characteristics. All regressions 
are OLS regressions. All regressions include an intercept which is not reported. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All regressions 
include broad (10 categories) industry fixed effects and intercepts that are not presented. Standard errors are 





Miscalibration ST Miscalibration LT Optimism ST Optimism LT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.164 0.189** 0.006 -0.171**
(0.123) (0.068) (0.099) (0.068)
Professional experience 0.068 -0.106 -0.056 0.129**
(0.082) (0.075) (0.066) (0.046)
Education 0.030 0.139 -0.007 -0.116***
(0.049) (0.082) (0.052) (0.034)
Gender (male = 1) -0.229 -0.048 0.327*** -0.070
(0.224) (0.243) (0.095) (0.116)
Propertion of incentives -0.085* 0.014 0.074 0.002
(0.041) (0.037) (0.052) (0.017)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 394 396 394 396
Adj. R
2 0.024 0.009 0.006 -0.00031 
 
Table 6. Persistence of Miscalibration  
The table explores whether miscalibration and optimism are persistent over time for respondents and whether 
respondents update based on new information. For each respondent that appears on the survey more than once, we 
use the current observation as the dependent variable, and the most recent response before the current survey as the 
independent (“lagged”) variable. All regressions are OLS regressions. All regressions include an intercept which is 
not reported. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote two-tailed significance at the 10%, 




Miscalibration ST Miscalibration LT Optimism ST Optimism LT









max(0, 12-month past S&P 500 return) 0.002* 0.001 -0.003** -0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
min(0, 12-month past S&P 500 return) -0.002 0.002 0.005*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1622 1586 1622 1586
Adj. R
2 0.309 0.079 0.145 0.11332 
 
Table 7. Own-Firm IRR Miscalibration and S&P 500 Miscalibration 
The table presents results about the relation between own-firm IRR miscalibration and S&P 500 miscalibration. The 
dependent variable is miscalibration based on self-reported IRR. All regressions are OLS regressions. All 
regressions include industry fixed effects which are based on ten broad industry classifications (provided by 
respondents). Involved in investments restricts the sample to executives who reported that they are involved in 
investment decisions (provided score of 5 or more, out of 7, in the investment involvement question). All 
regressions include an intercept which is not reported. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, *** 








Miscalibration ST 0.373*** 0.390**
(0.087) (0.124)
Miscalibration LT 0.096 0.117
(0.074) (0.102)
Optimism ST 0.026 0.038
(0.062) (0.064)
Optimism LT -0.065 -0.038
(0.052) (0.094)






Table 8. Miscalibration, Optimism, and Corporate Investment 
The table presents results about the relation between managerial miscalibration and investment intensity. The 
dependent variable is investment intensity (net investment / total assets), expressed in percentage terms. All 
regressions are OLS regressions. All regressions include an intercept which is not reported. Industry fixed effects are 
based on 2-digit SIC level classification. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. *, **, *** denote two-
tailed significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the 2-digit SIC level. 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Miscalibration ST 0.257 0.301
(0.246) (0.249)
Optimism ST 0.521 0.748
(0.405) (0.470)
Miscalibration ST × Optimism ST 0.337**
(0.145)
Miscalibration LT 0.751*** 0.719**
(0.272) (0.282)
Optimism LT 0.856* 1.089**
(0.451) (0.506)
Miscalibration LT × Optimism LT 0.239*
(0.123)
Market leverage 9.580** 9.504** 10.726*** 10.683***
(3.757) (3.718) (3.662) (3.643)
log(Sales) -1.035** -1.026** -0.983** -0.966**
(0.421) (0.420) (0.428) (0.425)
Asset Market-to-book -0.390 -0.389 -0.388 -0.392
(0.409) (0.412) (0.418) (0.418)
Profitability 29.646*** 29.579*** 29.614*** 29.561***
(7.959) (7.947) (8.015) (8.013)
Repurchases -2.954*** -2.944*** -3.049*** -3.055***
(0.828) (0.829) (0.843) (0.838)
Dividends 1.114 1.139 1.479 1.448
(1.052) (1.066) (1.077) (1.071)
12-month past returns 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Survey Date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2044 2044 2013 2013
Pseudo R
2 0.111 0.112 0.112 0.112
Investment intensity (%)34 
 
Figure 1. Time-Series of CFO Miscalibration 
 
The figure presents the percentage of CFOs whose S&P 500 realized returns fall in the 80% 





Figure 2. Distribution of One-Year S&P 500 Volatilities 
Figure 2a. Historical Distribution of S&P 500 One-Year Volatility (1950-2000) 
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Imputed individual short-term volatility36 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Ten-Year S&P 500 Volatilities 
Figure 3a. Historical Distribution of S&P 500 Ten-Year Volatility (1950-2000) 
 




















0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5















0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Imputed individual average long-term volatility